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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The only rna tter we wish to amplify in connection
'vith Plaintiff's statement of the case is the fact that
a hearing on this defendant's application was regularly
held in nlurray City, Utah, on February 16 and 17, 1940,
after due notice given, (R. 10, 11, 47, 48) and the Public
Service Commission thereupon heard testimony and received evidence for two full days, and gave ample opportunity for all interested parties and persons to be
heard. The Report and Order of the Commission granting defendant's application was made on March 14,
1940, wherein the Airway Motor Coach !.Jines was ordered to commence operations on or before June 1, 1940, or
the authority granted would automatical~y be cancelled
(R. 55).
Thereupon, the Airway company ordered equipment and made necessary preparations to commence
operations, and did actually institute service pursuant
to the certificate on May 21, 1940, and ever since has
been and now is operating the service contemplated by
the certificate of convenience and necessity.
We do not assent to the statement· of alleged issues
before the Commission, ( pp. 2 and 3 of Plaintiff's brief)
as being a proper and pertinent statement of the case
before this court, for the reasons hereafter given.
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II. QUESTIONS INVOLVED FOR
DETERMINATION
The statute prescribes the limits and scope of review an,d questions to be determined by the Supreme
Court in cases of this type. Commencing at about the
middle· of Section 76-6-16, R.S.U. 1933, it reads:
"No new or additional evidence may be introduced in the supreme court, but the cause shall be
heard on the record of the commission as,. certified
by it. The review shall not be extended further than
to determine whether the commission has regularly
pursue·d its authority, including a determination of
whether the order of decision under review violates
any right of the petitioner under the constitution of
the United ~States or of the State of Utah. The find-

ings and conclusions of the commission on questions
of fact shall be final and shall not be subject to review. Such questions of fact shall include ultimate
facts· and the findings and conclusions of t~e commission on reasonableness and discrimination. * * * ''
In other words, th'ere are only two questions before
the court for review on this appeal:
.
1. Has the Commission regularly pur5ued its au'

thority1
2. Does the Order or decision under review violate
any right of the plaintiff under the constitution of the
United States or of the State of Utah 1
Nowh~re in its brief or argument does plaintiff
claim that the order or decision under review violates
any of its rights under the constitution of the United
States or of the State of Utah. The only question remaining for consideration by this court then, is whether
or not the Commission regularly pursued its authority.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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III. DID THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
REGULARLY PURSUE ITS AUTHORITY?

1. In General
...\.uthority conferred by the Legislature upon the
Commission is contained in Section 76-6-1, R.S.U. 1933,
which reads:
• •..._\11 heariugs, investigations and proceedings
shall be go,yerned by this chapter and by rules of
practice and the procedure to be adopted by the
public utilities commission; in the conduct thereof
the technical rules of evidence need not be applied.
X o informality in any hearing, investigation or proceeding, or in the manner of taking testimony, shall
invalidate any order, decision, rule or regulation
made, approved or confirmed by the commission.''

Admittedly this is a broad authority. In reviewing
the errors which plain tiff asserts have been committed,
the statute just quoted \vill answer many, if not all of
plaintiff's arguments. This court and other courts, which
have considered similar provisions in other statutes
have uniformly held that they will not substitute their
judgment for that of the Commission and that the extent
of the courts inquiry will be limited to a determination
of the questions remitted to them by the Legislature.
The general rule is stated at 51 C.J. 82:
"The order \vill not be set aside unless positive
illegality or invalidity appears, and then only to the
C'Xtent of such unla\vfulness. * * * \\'here the conclusion arrived at by the Commission finds justifieation in the evidence, the court \vill ordinarily not
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review the facts, and it will not substitute its judg..
ment for that of the Commission."
Any number of authorities can be cited in support
of this established rule, which probably will not be
questioned. We refer to one Utah case which clearly defines the extent and limitations for review of a decision
or order of the Public Service Commission under our
statute. In the case of Salt Lake City, et. al., v. Utah
Light and Traction Company, 52 Utah 210, 173 Pac. 556,
Case No. 3209, the present plaintiff, Utah Light and
Traction Company was successful in having a decision
of the Public Service Commission upheld. We might
profitably incorporate by reference a portion· of their
brief and argument in that earlier case on the scope and
limitations of the Commission's authority and review
thereof by the court. However, the decision is sufficiently
explicit for our· purposes. The court said at p. 562-3 of
173 Pac.:

''When the findings and the op1n1on filed by
the Commission are considered together, as in this
case we think they should be, we are of the opinion
that the objection that the findings are insufficient
is not tenable, and hence that objection must fail.
* * * After a careful examination of the authorities
we are more than ever confir1ned in the opinion that
all that we can review in cases of this kind is
"\Vhether there is any evidence to sustain the findings
of the commission, whether it has exercised its authority according to law and \Vhether any constitutional rights of the complaining party have been invaU:ed or disregarded. In v1e'v that the commission
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is n1erely au arm of the Legislature through 'vhom
the body a.ets in matters of this kind, but a moment's reflection conYinces any one that this court
may not interfere except for the reasons just stated.
If interference 'vere extended beyond those limits,
it "'"ould, in effect, be an interference by this court
'Yith the la¥lmaking power of this state. It requires
no arg'ument to show "'"hy that may not be done. We
have no more right to interfere with the duties and
powrers of the Leg-islature than that body has to interfere with the po"Ters and duties imposed upon us
as a court. True, the Legislature could perhaps have
g·iven orders of some,vhat greater powers to pass
upon the findings and orders of the commission.
,Such has been done in some other jurisdictions. The
Legislature of this state has, however, not seen fit
to clothe this court "'Ti th greater powers of review,
and we have neither the inclination or the right to
exercise a power which is neither inherent nor properly conferred. * * * ''
Plaintiff outlines its present conceptions on the
scope and limitations upon the administrative process
on pages 36 to 45 of its brief.
Rowell vs. State Board of Agriculture, 99 P (2) 1,
cited by plaintiff, (Brief, 36) of course, involves a different delegation of authority by the· Legislature than
that delegated to the Public Service Commission, although we are not inclined to question the general principles which plaintiff quotes from the case.

vV e part company with plaintiff when it attemp~s to
construe the statutes and cases, and particularly, GilUJ.er vs. Public Utilities Commission, 67 Utah 222, 247
Pac. 284 (Brief, 37) to mean that the Commission i~
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limited in its powers to the regulation of monopolies
and cannot ever allow a necessary and beneficial competitive service. This conception is perhaps the fallacy
which caused Plaintiff to neglect its responsibilities and
duties to fully serve the public, and to leave the door
open to the present application to serve.
In 1935 the Legislature declared:
''The Commission is vested with power and authority and it shall be its duty to supervise and regulate
all common motor carriers * * * so as to meet the
needs of any community, and so as to insure adequate transportation service to the territory traversed by such common motor carriers, and so as to
prevent unnecessary du.plication of service~ between
these common motor carriers * * * and the Commission may require the coordination of the service and
schedules of competing common carriers by motor
vehicles," etc. Laws of Utah, 1935, Chap. 65. Quoted, Pl. Brief, 42).
It is not uncommon in this state or elsewhere for
two or more· common carriers to serve the same area or
route.
No ''unnecessary'' duplication of service is proposed by the Order of the Commission in this case. This
court will not accept Plaintiff's assertion on that point
as against the opinion of the Commission. Plaintiff concedes that the majority of the Commission acted "pursuant to their best belief and judgment, expressing their
best views for the result reached.'' (Brief, 74)
If there is an inconsistency between what plain tiff
terms the "regulated monopoly" statutes of 1917, and
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the 1935 la \YS goYl\rning duplieating and competing
common carrier ser,~ice, \\Te submit that the later enactment would c~._nltrol. Is this ''the departure from basic or
fundamental principles'' \Yhich is complained about~
(Brief, 11) The case of ~1cCarthy vs. Public Service
Commission, 9± lT tah 304, 77 Pac. ( 2) 331, does not declare the 1935 la "T inYalid or uphold monopoly under all
circumstances, as plaintiff seems to infer. (Brief, 39-41)
On the other hand, the court recognized the propriety
of competitive service in proper cases, when it said:
But competition is not, in itself and al\vays,
a benefit to the public or in the public interest; not
any more than is monopoly always in the public interest. Rather, it lies in a medium bet\veen the two."
H

The court then quotes from a case to the same effect,
which says the test in each instance is the public good .
.A. nd \Yho is to determine that~ Obviously, the Public
Service Commission, and no one else .
.A. s the 1\ ew York Commission recently said in a
case similar to the present one:
•·Regulated monopoly has certain rights to be
protected from unjust or unreasonable competition,
but not from fair and reasonable competition, and
certainly not at the expense of restricting the use
of llC\Y and improved public fa~ili ties by the public.
\Ve do not consider the proposed competition either
unjust or unreasonable." Re Grand Island Transit
Corporation. 27 P.U.R. (NS) at 343.
Plaintiff quotes from the }.1cCarthy case, supra
(Brief 39-40) a splendid comparison of the rights of
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competing carriers to share in a stream of transportation business flowing over a given route, to the rights of
rival appropriators of water from a natural stream or
source of supply where there is insufficient water in the
source to fully satisfy the wants or needs of all. If a
hearing had been held in the McCarthy case, and the
evidence had shown, as it did in the instant case, that
the present operator had failed to make a beneficial use
of its operating certificate; was failing to fully serve
points on its present Murray, Midvale, Sandy route, and
was not serving or offering to serve points contiguous to
said route which required service, the court would then
undoubtedly have concluded as the Commission did in
the present case, that the area was open to additional
service (appropriation) to fully meet the convenience
and necessity of the public. The analogy is sound and
pertinent. McCarthy case was reversed for the reason
that the decision was made ex parte, without notice or
hearing, and as the court said; the Commission ''did not
regularly pursue its authority under the governing statute." (77 Pac. (2) at 338) That is the whole and only
question now before this court.
A statement from the Gilmer case is emphasizeq
(Brief, 37, 45 and R. 108) that "the very purpose of the
Utili ties Act is to prevent one utility from destroying
another," to which we wholeheartedly subscribe as being one purpose of the Act. However, "\\re do not believe
that Plaintiff-'s conclusion on that question of fact, viz.
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that one utility 'vill destroy another in the present instance, is to be accepted in preference to the presumption that the Commission acted in the best interests of
not only the utilities involved, but for the public 'vhich
they are supposed to serve. Furthermore, there is no
evidence or reason to believe that if the southern portion
of Plaintiff's route No. 12 were competitive or even if
it were eliminated, that it 'vould destroy or even impair
the Plaintiff corporation. The suggestion is ridiculous.
On the other hand, there is good reason to believe that
the Plaintiff would materially benefit either (1) by discontinuing service beyond 33rd South on its Route 12, or
(2) by stimulated use of the bus facilities over a period
of time. (R. 53).
Plaintiff seems to be under the misapprehension

throughout its brief that the so-called Utilities Act is
for the exclusive benefit of the utilities. But consider
Chapter 66, Laws of Utah, 1935 which reads:

·'If the Commission :finds from the evidence
that the public convenience and necessity require
the proposed service or any part thereof, it shall
issue the certificate as prayed for.''
\Ve understand the Act to mean that the public should
·be given first consideration. It is significant that the
Legislature recently changed the name of the Commission from "Public Utili ties" to "Public Service".
The Commission had no thought of permitting the
Airway Company to destroy the Traction Company-
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a mouse to destroy a lion. Rather, it performed its duty
by providing a practical solution to a very real and
practical problem. That problem might be summarized
thus:

(1) The Traction Company for years has been operating at a loss, or at most breaking even on its Murray, Midvale, Sandy operations south of 33rd South, and
has expressed a desire to "forget everything south of
33rd South.'' (R. 50, 173, 205; 225, 446.)
(2) The citizens in that area do not enjoy adequate
or satisfactory bus service or fares, and the public convenience and necessity requires. .additional service. There
exists an antagonism on the part of the public. toward
the exis.ting operator due to long-standing differences.
(R. 196-197, 201, 213, 222, 230, 236, 242, 268, 273, 287,
400)
(3) An improvement in the service and fares of the
Traction Company cannot be made without causing further injury and loss to it on this operation. (R. 51, 454,
466)
'
( 4) A group of six communities farther out in
Salt Lake County; to wit, Riverton, Crescent, West Jordan, South Jordan, Bennion, and Taylorsville, contiguous to the Murray, Midvale, Sandy area, are without
bus transportation at all, and the pu'blic convenience and
necessity require such service. (R. 261, 286~ 298, 338, 348,
357, 400) The Traction Company sees no need for such
servic;e. (R. 442-3)
(5) The Commission has before it the application
of the Airway Motor Coach Lines, Inc., to serve the outside area and to provide the needed additional service
to the Murray, Midvale, Sandy area at satisfactory fares,
which ap,plication has received general public endorsement. (R. 221, 222) It has no such applica,tion from the
Traction Company, or any other applicant.
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The Report and Order of the Commission solved
these problems "~ith one stroke: It enabled the Traction
Company to eliminate or at least minimize its loss on an
unpr-ofitable route. It gaYe the people in the "served"
area just what they r~quired, wanted and fought for
years to obtain in bus transportation. It gave the outside
communities the bus transportation which they sought,
and needed, and it allowed the application which was
before it to serve an unserved area and provide this
needed additional service to the Murray, Midvale, Sandy
area. On the basis of these established facts, the Commission's decision is well-reasoned and well-founded in
la,,.. , and it regularly pursued its authority under the
governing statutes in the present case.

2. Analysis of Plaintiff's Brief and Argume·nt
Plaintiff asserts that there are three questions involved in this case, three alleged errors which are identical in substance to the questions involved, and its enentire brief and argument is based upon these three
principles. These principles upon which Plaintiff bases
i.ts case are succinctly stated in the index of its brief as
follows:
(.1-\..) The Commission has failed to make findings
of fact on rna terial issues.

(B) The Commission has made findings of fact not
supported by any substantial evidence.
(C)

The action of the defendant Commission is
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contrary to law, in violation of statute and arbitrary
and capricious.
The (A) and (B) points of plaintiff's brief are based on alleged inadequate and improper findings of fact.
Before entering into a discussion of the merits of these
points ·we wish to demur to them. In other words, do
they constitute an argument for a review of the decision
of the Commission' Is not the Report of the Commission. sufficient to meet the requirement of Sec. 76-6-1,
R.S.U. 1933, above quoted' We believe it is, and that the
demur should be sustained.
The Commission probably went further than was
n~cessary in writing up its R~port. It would have been
sufficient if it had simply stated the ultimate fact that
the public convenience and necessity justified granting
the application. And Plaintiff incidentally admits that
the Commission found there was a public necessity and
convenience for the proposed service. (Brief, 69) The
Califorri~a supreme court, under a similar statute, makes
just such a holding when it says:
"Here the Commission found the ultimate fact
that the public convenience and necessity did not
require the ·exercise of the privileges in.' controversy,
and neither the sufficiency of the evidence, nor the
soundness of the reasoning, upon which that finding
was based, can be considered on this proceeding.''
Oro Electric Corporation vs. Railroad Commission,
147 Pac. 118; at p. 119.
The (A), (B) and (C) points upon which Plaintiff
rests its case will now be considered individually, but
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'vithout

"~aiving

our demur thereto.

3. Plaintiff's point (A)· pertaining to failure of the
Commission to make findings on material issues.
In particular, plaintiff complains that the Commission failed to find ( 1) as to the extent of the existing
service of the Plaintiff, and (2) other common motor
carriers and electric railroads into the area affected by
the application.
Th~ fact is the Commission went thoroughly into
the operations of Plaintiff and ''others'' affected by this
application. Exhibit "B" was received in evidence (R.
3, 127) which is a map showing all operations of all
common carriers in that area affected by the application.
Plaintiff complains that there is no finding on that matter. It apparently has overlooked the statement of the
Commission contained in its report (R. 50-51) which
reads:
''There are at present two common carriers operating in the territory proposed to be served by applicant. The Salt Lake & Utah Railroad Corporation
operates in the territory adjacent to Redwood Road
and has five trains north into Salt Lake City and
five from Salt Lake City south per day, which stop
approximately every mile to take on and discharge
passengers.
"The Utah Light and Traction Company operates a bus service southward upon State Street,
serving lVIurray, ·~:[idvale and ~Sandy. Its schedule is
22~ minutes during the peak periods and 45 minutes at other ti1nes."
vVha t more specific statement could Plain tiff ask
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for? These are the only common carriers operating in
the territory involved, and Plaintiff's contention that
''other common motor carriers and electric railroads''
were not considered in the findings is collateral and obviously without foundation.
We submit that matter
without further comment.
Plaintiff next contends (Brief, 14-28) that the Commission failed to make findings as to whether or not
Plaintiff's service is adequate to meet the needs of the
public, and if not wherein it is inadequate and whether
Plaintiff has been and now is willing and ready to render adequate service. Also the need for the service proposed by the defendant Airway Motor Coach Lines, Inc.,
and whether it would be a duplication of existing service. This question is also raised later on and is fully discussed hereafter.
Plaintiff does not discuss the Re.port of the Commission to which its criticism is directed, but launches
into a discussion of the testimony of various witnesses.
In this discussion we do not suggest that Plaintiff has
not properly represented the testimony, but it has selected brief extracts to make a point, and we suggest that a
more complete reading is essential to understand the
very definite trend of the facts and opinions. For instance, it will appear by a more complete reading that
the reason several of these witnesses, as well as a great
many other persons did not fully utilize the services of
the Traction Company was because the service was in-
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adequate and unsatisfactory. (See summary p. 10 supra,
R. 201)
Even the only three 'vi tnesses produced by Plaintiff
'vho "~ere not in its employ turned out to be critical of
the service. One, Hayden (R. 303-'5) had a lot of complaint about the serYice, and was not opposed to the 'application. One, ~Sampson (R. 365) lived north of Murray
City and south of 33rd South, and '\vhile the rates charg. .
ed were not particularly adverse to him or. perhaps to
those living in that limited area, he recognized the unreasonableness of the fare structure as far as Murray City
residents were concerned. Plain tiff's third witnesses,
Aamodt (R.366) complained about the service and fares,
and rode home '\vith his boss at night rather than utilize
the Traction Company service. The testimony of all of
the other witnesses who were users or potential users of
the existing service strongly condemned it. Of course,
the employee witnesses of Plaintiff quite naturally testified that their own service was satisfactory, and it was
stipulated that they would testify that they had endeavored to give good service. The Commission however, was
not bound by their testimony or by counsel's stipulation
which Plaintiff construes (Brief, 17) to be a stipulation·
that the operators in fact endeavored to give courteous
service. But a discussion of testimony, as we have indicated, seems to be beside the point which Plaintiff
here raises pertaining to the findings of the Commission.
\Ve again quote from the Report of the Commission,
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and submit that in the light of the foregoing statutory
requirements, and decisions interpreting same, that its
findings and conclusions are sufficient, and do not afford
a basis for the objections advanced by plaintiff. The
Commission stated in its Report (R. 50-53) :
"There are at the present time two common
carriers operating in the territory proposed to be
served by applicant. The Salt Lake & Utah Railroad
Corporation operates in the territory adjacent to
Redwood Road and has five trains north into Salt
Lake City and five from Salt Lake City south per
day, which stop approximately every mile to take
on and discharge passengers. The Utah Light &
Traction Company operates a bus service south,vard
upon State Street, serving ¥urray, Midvale, and
,Sandy. Its schedule is 220 minutes during the peak
periods and 45 minutes at other times.
"Witnesses for the applicant testified that the
rates charged by the present opera tors are so high
that pe·ople refrain from using the service and resort
to other means of transportation. The rates now in
effect are the lowest that this Commission has been
able to procure. However, voluntary reductions
would at any time have been in order. When the
Commission has sought reductions, the attitude of
the Traction Company has been that the operation
of this line, as also the operation of the Traction
system as a whole, yielded little or no return upon
the investment, and if the ~Iurray-Sandy line 'vere
granted further reductions, it would mean that the
now meager net returns of the 'J~raction Company
would be further reduced and the users of the service in Salt l..Jake City would be forced to carry in
part the costs of the service beyond the city li1nits.
(R. 50-51)
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The proposal of the applicant is to operate so that ~lnrray, Sandy, Crescent, Draper, MidYale, \Vest Jordan, Riverton, Taylorsville, and Bennion ""ill all have the bus service. These constitute
the population centers in the area south of Salt
Lake C~ity in Salt Lake County. The applicant's
proposed operation \vould institute a common carrier bus serYiee to \"\Test Jordan, Riverton, TaylorsYille. and Bennion, \vhich do not no\v have any such
Sel'YlCe.
''The Commission is of the opinion that even
though some of the territory is now being given
common carrier service, public convenience and
necessity would justify the issuance of the authority
requested by the applicant so that the aforeme·n* *

tioned territory which does not now have common
carrier service might be a.fforded the opportunity
of such a service.
"Further, it appears proper to grant to the
public in the remainder of the territory the privilege of enjoying more adequate facilities. at such
savings to themselves as this applicant proposes.
Doubtless, lower rates with a service so frequent as
here proposed would add to the convenience of the
traveling· public and would contribute over a period
of time to a greater use of the common carrier facilities. In addition, benefit materially through having a ne\v or a better system of transportation into
Salt Lake City and between various communities
\vithin the County.
''It was testified that with better service at
lower rates new homes and new enterprises would
develop in the territory beyond Salt Lake City
limits and that general development of that area
\Vould be promoted by the granting of this application. This, of course, places a responsibility upon
the carrier and upon the Commission, which re-
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And Plaintiff says, "there are no findings at all!"
(Brief, 27)
Under Plaintiff's conception of "necessity", "the
need must be such as to warrant the expense of making
the improvement." (Brief, 27) The statement may contain some truth as applied to "utility necessity", but it
is an approach to the problem from the wrong direction.
A clear-cut definition of "public necessity" is made by
the Oklahoma Supreme Court, viz:
"A public need, without which the public is inconvenienced to the extent of being handicapped in
the pursuit of business or wholesome pleasure, or
both without which the people generally of the
community are denied to their detriment that which
is enjoyed by other people similarly situated.'' Missouri K. & 0. Coach Lines, Inc. v. State, 81 Pac. (2)
660, 664; 26 P.U.R. (NS) 517. .

4. Plaintiff's point (B) pertaining to findings not supported by substantial evidence.
There is nothing in the statute or elsewhere compelling the Commiss_ion to base its findings upon "substantial'' evidence. This court has definitely said that ''all
we can review in cases of this kind is whether there is
any evidence to sustain the findings of the Commission''
etc. Salt Lake City v. Utah Light and Traction Co., 52
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556. Fuller-Toponce Truck Co. v.

Public SerYice Commission, et. al., 96 Pac. ( 2) 722, 98
Utah. Plaintiff may be confused by the rule in an ordinary appeal in a la\v case, or perhaps by an Illinois
statute which requires ''substantial'' evidence in utility
cases, and it has cited at least three Illinois cases in its
brief. The cases decided under the Utah statute and the
California statute \Yhich is similar are unanimous in
saying that any evidence is sufficient:
Plaintiff contends that there is no substantial evidence to support the Commission's findings with respect
to the matter of rates. (Brief, 29) Rates are only one of
the elements upon which the decision of the Commission
rests. The dealings of the people and the Commission
with the Traction Company at various times with respect to rates was thoroughly gone into. (R. 196-7, 2879) The testimony on this matter must have proven

embarrassing to the Traction Company. Just as an example, take Mayor Berger's testimony, where he said:
"There have been a great many protests in
times past at the service and fares that the Utah
Po,ver and Light, or Traction Company, have put
into effect. "\Y. e have a continuous stream of people
coming in to see the Murray City Commission either
as a commission, or individually, to protest the
schedule and fares that are now in effect by the
Traction Company. Now, sometime ago, (I am not
prepared to say just when) this new bus company,
_Airways, contacted us to see whether we wo~ld be
favorable t<nvard granting them a franch1se to
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operate in Murray City. M:u.rray City's Commission's attitude was that they would be glad to grant
anyone a franchise or a privilege that 'vould come
in here and better our service and reduce the fares;
do something toward making a more pleasant attitude between the people that are using the bus service than was going on at present. There seems to
be a v-ery hostile attitude toward the Traction Company for the way they have treated Murray over a
number of years in regards to franchises, promises
that they have made as to what they would do toward giving us better service and reduce fares. So of
course we were open to suggestions for better
service for our locality here; and from what investigating we have done of the service that this new
company could give us, it seems quite superior to
anything that the Traction Company has given us
in the past. Of course we went on record as saying
that we would be glad to do what we could to get
this service if the Public Service Commission granted them the privilege of coming into our te1Ti tory.
(R. 196-7)
The second matter on which plaintiff claims the
Commission made :findings not supported by substantial
evidence (Brief, 30) is the conclusion of fact by the
Commission that there is as much as 46%~ difference between the rates of Plaintiff and the Applicant's proposed rates. That conclusion, and perhaps many others
could be arrived at on the basis of the general confusion
which existed as to fares being charged by Plaintiff.
(R. 237, 267, 288, 306, 451) However, the findings which
Plaintiff complains of finds basis in the evidence that a
passenger could pay two tokens, or a total of 16 2/3 cents
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for t'vo farPs from ~Iurray to Salt Lake City, while he
might ride upon the . .-\pplicant 's bus for 9 cents, or 54
percent of 16

~./3 rent~.

It is true that the passenger

also might ride for 15 cents cash fare· upon Plaintiff's
bus, but there still is a w·ide difference in the amount of
fare r barged.
The decision of the Commission is not predicated
wholly upon this particular statement in the Report
\Yhich Plaintiff stresses. It could be stricken or ignored
\vithout affecting the result and decision arrived at. The
statement "~as probably intended as a polite rebuke,
justly due the Plaintiff in the light of the severe testimony \vhich Vlas given against it.
The third and fourth extracts from the Commission's Report \vhich Plaintiff claims has no support in
the evidence, is a conclusion to the effect that the existing service will not be substantially impaired and that
patrons will continue to enjoy the benefits of existing
rates. (Brief, 31) There is evidence to the effect that
by granting the application the business into the area
could easily be doubled or trebled. (R. 223-6, 242) This
conclusion of the Commission, based on this or upon
other evidence is logical, and should be accepted as
against contrary opinions and conclusions of the parties
or even the court. In any event, it is a conclustion of
fact supported by evidence and therefore not subject to
rev1ew.
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5.

Plaintiff's Point (C), that the Report and Order of
the Commission is contrary to law, in violation of
statute and arbitrary and capricious.

The first ground for complaint under Plaintiff's
point (C) is that the Defendant Airway lacked the necessary local franchises. This matter is entirely collateral
to the interests of the Plaintiff, and we challenge its
right to raise the question. In the case of Chicago Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co. vs. Commercial Commission, (Ill.) 178 N.E. 157, the protesting utility assigned as error that the applicant had not filed the consent of the Department of Public Works and Buildings
required by the Illinois statute, and that the Commission
had made no finding thereon. To this contention, the
court replied, at page 161, para. 3:
"We find no authority for this contention * * *
It is objected that the consent was not issued until
after proofs were closed before the Commission.
Appellant's rights were not prejudiced there by."
The holding of that case is in accordance with the gen-'
eral law, that a decision will not be reversed because
of a non-prejudicial error, if we may assume such to be
an error.
,Section 76-4-24, subsection 3, R.S.U. 1933 provides:
"Every applicant for such a certificate shall
file in the office of the Commission such evidence as
shall be required by the Commission to show that
such applicant has received the required consent,
franchise or permit of the proper county, city, municipal or other public authority * * * . ''
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1) r: rTL)st!mony giYen by l\Ir. DaYis for the Applicant
'Yas as follows:

"'Q. You do haYe a franchise in Salt Lake City,
do you not·?
"' -\_ Oh, yes, \YC have a franchise in Salt Lake
City.
~ ~ Q. I think you said you had arranged for
other necessary franchises~
•· . .\. Yes, "\Ve have made arrangements for those
franchises. ' '
Again at R. 123 (Trans. 10):

"Q. Now, you have the necessary franchises,
or arranged for them, for the operations applied for
under this application~
''A. Yes, sir.''
Finally, Chairman Holbrook of the Commission interrogated Nlr. Davis on the matter (R. 153) and presumably the evidence furnished was satisfactory to the
Commission, as required by the statute.
In the instant case, the proposed service was largely inter-city, with the exception of Murray. Mr. Howe,
of counsel, appeared at the instance of Murray City
(R. 114, 201); and the ~lurray City officials testified for
the Applicant, (R. 195, 211) and stated that a franchise
would be available to Airway. (R. 216)
It is the prerogative of the local authorities to require local franchises, and the statute was enacted for
their protection. Plaintiff's complaint on this point is
not well taken, particulariy when it apparently does not
come into court V{ith clean hands to make complaint
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about the. Airway's local franchises. (R. 197, bottom of
page.)
Plaintiff next departs in its brief (pp. 36-45 inclusive) to discuss its conception of the scope and limitations upon the administrative process. This matter has
already been given thorough consideration (p. 3-10 herein) and the arguments here advanced by Plaintiff are
fully answered.
The second ground under Plaintiff's point (C)
brings the financial ability of the defendant Airway to
perform the proposed service into question. This question_ of fact is one to which the Commission gave a
great deal of attention, both at the hearing and in preparing its decision. The Commission was clearly within
its rights in granting the certificate of convenience and
necessity and making it contingent upon Applicant procuring $15,000 cash in addition to its other assets. A
precedent for this procedure may be found in the case
of Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Commerce Commission, 178
N. E. 157.
The supreme court of Washington also has recognized the propriety of this procedure in the case of Ma..
honey Auto Freight vs. Department of Public Works, 6
Pac (2) 64. In the first paragraph on page 67 of that
case it said, speaking of the applicant carriers:
"All have, or can obtain, adequate means to
finance the proposed operations.''
This is one of the questions of fact which the legis-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

lature has specifically tlelegntvtl to the Public Service
C\nnn1ission tu determine. ThE} possession of credit is an
asset 'Yhieh the Commission might properly consider.
The ~\pplicant proffered a performance bond, which
"·as disenssed at length. (R. 3~0, et seq.) It is sufficient
to say that the financial resources of the Defendant
w·ere thoroughly gone into, (R. 156) and the Commission
required it to raise $15,000 in outside capital, after
'vhich the Commission implied that the Applicant would
be fully qualified financially. This the Applicant did,
and made due proof thereon, to the satisfaction of the
Commission. (R. 103)
Plaintiff is simply insisting on arguing a question
of fact, ""ith respect to which the judgment of the Commission should be regarded as conclusive.
Next, Plaintiff again contends (Brief, 48) that the
Commission failed to consider the existing transportation facilities in the terri tory proposed to be served, and
the belated offer of the Traction Company to render the
needed service. The first part of this contention has already been discussed (p. 13 herein) and sho,vn to be obviously untrue. The service of the Traction Company
was thoroughly considered, almost unanimously deplored, and found to be inadequate. (R. 34, 50-52, 203, 213,
236, 269, 287' 302, 306, 394, 400.)
With respect to the second part of the contention,
the Traction Company never at any time filed its application to render the needed service. It left the door open
to defendant's application. The Commission could not
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compel the Traction Company to file such an application,
especially with respect to a service which it claims is not
feasible. (R. 442-3) The Commission could only act on
an application which was before it; not on a general
verbal offer, the sincerity of which is questionable. (R.
298) How similar is the case of Re Grand Island Transit
Corporation, 27 P.U.R. (NS) at p. 343, where the Commission said:
"Finally, it cannot be overlooked that the I.R.
C. as the principal local transportation agency in
the territory was first offered the opportunity to
render the desired service which presumably it
could have done with a minimum of loss to itself
and a minimum reduction in its existing mainland
service. This it had a perfect right to do, but it now
stands in the weak position of opposing the rendering of the service by another company. It may say
'I will not'. It may not say 'You shall not'."
Plaintiff has misstated the fact with respect to the
Defendant Airway's application. (Brief, 49) It is made
to appear that the original purpose of Applicant was
to duplicate the ·Traction Company's service to Midvale
and Sandy, and the service into territory beyond there
was developed as an afterthought. The indisputable fact
is that for years the people beyond Murray, Midvale and
Sandy have sought bus service on their own initiative.
The Traction Company was not interested in giving this
service and did not hear their pleas because they were
ready to abandon their service south of 33rd South
rather than expand or extend it. The Traction Company
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has JleYer filed an applieation to render the service farther out, and in fact doubts the feasibility of the service
there (R. 4±2-3) as it has on other routes which the
Air\vay no'v operates. (R.. 456)
The original application of the Airway (R. 1) included serYice into the entire area, and there was no
afterthoug·ht or anything subsequently appended to include the outside territory as suggested in Plaintiff's
Brief (p. 49, 52) and in Commissioner Wiesley's dissenting opinion. (R. 107) Those suggestions are absolutely untrue, and represent a further attempt to explain
aw·ay the failure of the Plaintiff over a number of years
to provide needed service· into southern Salt Lake
County, and the resulting resentment of the people
against that operator. The application was not "sugarcoated" (Brief, 57, R. 110); it simply appeared sweet
in contrast to the unsavory treatment and service accorded the public by the Plaintiff, whose vested rights
and operating privileges &eem to have blinded it to the
convenience and necessity of the public whom it was
supposed to serve. \\T e give to the Plaintiff credit, more
than to anyone or anything else, for the spontaneous
public support which it complains the defendant Airway has received. (Brief, 51)
We do not deem it advisable or properly within the
issues before this court to review the arguments and
pleadings which were before the Public Service Commission. (Brief, 51-52) These rna tters are fully consid-
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ered elsewhere, except perhaps the ironic suggestion
(Brief, 52) that the Airway has vested itself with a
duty self-imposed to perform the services of guardian
for the Plaintiff. The defendant Airway assumes no
such task. However, the legislature anticipated that the
Plaintiff, along with other utilities would need such a
guardian in the interest of the public, and imposed that
duty upon the other defendant, Public Service Commission, which is now attempting to discharge that
mandate. The only question for this court now to determine under our statute, as we have previously discussed,
is whether or not the Commission regularly pursued
that authority.

6. Supplemental and Duplicating Service.
Plaintiff's points (A) (3) and (C) (3), (Brief, 14,
48) are based on the fallacy that the Commission should
take the initiative and compel the Traction Company
to increase and extend its operations, and that its general verbal offer at the hearing (R. 434) to comply with
all "lawful" orders precludes this Defendant's application.
Appropriation of volume of traffic has been compared to appropriation of a quantity of water. (p. 7 supra) If a carrier abandons or fails to fully utilize its
franchise, the door is left open to the application of another to serve where service is lacking. It was incumbent on the Plaintiff-not the Commission-to protect
its operating privileges by giving complete service.
Plaintiff never at any time made application to serve
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the nnserYed area, and never at any time offered to
render the serYice closer in (regular 20 minute service
to 1furray, and 40 minute to Midvale and Sandy) which
this Defendant asked to render, and which the public
convenience and necessity required. In view of the
public need, the Commission bad no alternative but to
grant the only application that was before it.
Even if we could assume that the M;urray, Midvale,
Sandy service of the Traction Company was adequate,
it was proper for the Commission to permit the Applicant to participate in the business south of 33rd South
in order to enable the Applicant to serve the ''outside''
territory. The physical condition is such that the outside area consisting of seven small communities must
necessarily be served in connection with the service to
Murray, Midvale and ,Sandy, and this Defendant's ap. plication to serve the outside was neeessarily made contingent upon service to the closer-in and more populous
centers. In the words of the Commission:
"The Commission is of the opinion that even
though some of the territory is now being given
common carrier service, public convenience and necessity would justify the issuance of the authority
requested by the applicant so that the aforementioned territory which does not now have common
carrier service might be afforded the opportunity
of such service." (R. 52)
That finding and conclusion alone is probably sufficient to support the O.rder of the Commission. It was
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a "necessary" duplication of service in the opinion of
the Commission, and properly permitted under Chap. 65,
Sec. 5, Laws of Utah, 1935. Here are some precedents:
The California Commission in a similar situation
made a similar ruling, and held that where it appears
that a carrier must be allowed to participate in other
traffic in order to be able to render adequate transportation service in a terri tory requires it, a certificate permitting such participation is justified. Re Airline Bus
Line Co. (1938) 41 Cal. R. C. R. 602; P.U.R. Digest
( 1933-39) Vol. A, 241.
The United States Supreme Court recently said that
the authorization of a new and competitive motor bus
route depends solely upon whether the facts warrant a
finding that public convenience and necessity require
the service and whether as a whole it will be self-supporting. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley
Authority, 50 ~Sup. Ct. 366, 27 P.U.R. (NS) 1.
The New York Public Service Commission allowed
an application recently which was similar in fact to the
one under consideration. As in the present case, the
proposed service bene:fi tted an unserved area in addition
to the served area. The existing operator filed no application to render the proposed service, but did make
a verbal offer to render the proposed service. In granting the application, the Commission said:
''Any vested rights 'vhich an existing motor
carrier may have will not prevent similar service by
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another carrit•r on ne\\., more economical and more
direct routt•s. '' Rl) Grand Island Transit Corporation, ~7 P.lT.R. (NS) 337, at 342-3.
The Xew Hampshire Commission also explains that
it cannot disregard the convenience of the travelling
public, merely to protect the interest of a private operator. (1936) Re Boston & ~Iaine Transport Co. 18 N.H.
P.S.C.R. 40; 11 P.U.R. (NS) 419.
The supreme court of Oklahoma in a recent case
·which is remarkably similar in fact to the one now before this court, upheld the Commission of that state in
granting· a certificate of convenience and necessity to
serve a territory already being served in order to provide service to an unserved terri tory. In its decision the
court said:
priori t,\'" in the field is an element to be
considered, it will not of itself govern the granting
of certificates of convenience and necessity for operation of motorbus lines. The proper consideration is
"\vhich applicant, under the circumstances, shown by
the evidence, will best serve the public interest.''
l\Iissouri, K. & 0. Lines, Inc. v. State, 81 Pac. (2)
660 and 664; 26 P.U.R. (NS) 513, 517.
~ •\fhile

In the case of Bartonville Bus Line vs. Eagle Motor
Coach Lines, (Ill.) 157 N.E. 175, twice cited by Plaintiff (Brief, 54, 57) it was held that the lack of through
service between particular points under the existing
carrier service warranted the granting of a certificate
.of convenience and necessity to a competing bus line. It
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should be noted by way of comparison, that through, or
express service is contemplated between Salt Lake City
and 34th South street on the route in question.
The Missouri supreme court, in the case of State ex
rel Pitcairn vs. P.S.C. 222 S.W. (2d) 228, held that it
was within the discretion of the Public Service Commission to grant operating rights to a competing service
even though the existing carrier service was convenient
and adequate and even though such existing carriers
would be adversely affected thereby because the
legis.
lature had made the public service commission the judge
of' public convenience and necessity.
I

~

A good statement of the proposition is also contained in Southside Transportation Company vs. The Commonweafth of Virginia, 161 S.E. (2d) 895, which holds
that if it is necessary to duplicate existing service so
that the public may be benefitted; the courts and commissions have no hesitancy in granting· authority to
compet~ng carriers.

This is by no means .the first instance where the Utah
Commission has autho·rized duplicating and competing
service. At least three carriers operate between Salt
Lake City and Ogden, Utah and Salt Lake City and Provo, Utah. In all of the cases we have read upon this subject, the reasoning is based upon the fundamental prop.osition that the public interest is the paramount consideration.
Finally, the general law on the subject of duplica-
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tion of servire is \\'l)ll 8ta ted hv 1Ir. Pond the foremost
.
'
"?riter on the subject, taken from Georgia Highway Express vs. Harrison, (Ga.) 157 S.E. 464, (see also, Pond
on Public lT tili ties, 4th Ed., Vol. 3, at p. 1850) :

In detl•rmining· "' hether such certifiea te of convenience should be granted the public convenience
ought to be the Commis~don 's primary concern, the
interest of the public utility· companies already serving the territory secondary, and the desires and solicitations of the applicant of a relatively minor
consideration * * * The discretionary power of the
Commission to grant or 'vi thhold certificates of convenience and necessity to public utility companies
i~ broader than its power to govern rates and service of such companies. * * * Time and again this
court, consonant with the prevailing attitude of
courts throughout the country, has declared that it
will not substitute its judgment for that of some
ministrative tribunal created by legislative authority for dealing "\vith matters of non-judicial character."

7.

The Importance of Rates

]-,inally, Plaintiff contends (Brief, 57) that the certificate of convenience and necessity issued by the Commission is based on the contrast of rates and schedules
of Protestant concerning which no adequate findings
are made, and applicant's rate~/ and schedules.
\\7"hen Plaintiff complains about no "adequate''
ih1dings, its quarrel, as ~e heretofore indicated, is with
the Utah statute which permits the Commission to base
it~ decision on conclusions and ultimate facts, rather
than "adequate findings".
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However, the Report and Order of the Commission
in this case is not based exclusively or even mainly upon
rates as Plaintiff (Brief, 58) and the dissenting opinion
(R. 108) suggest. The offer of a company to operate at
a lower rate in itself is not sufficient reason to grant an
application, yet under our statutes (Sec. 5, Chap. 65,
Laws of Utah, 1935) and all of the cases in point, it is
an element which may properly be considered.
This is precisely the position the Commission has
taken in its Report and Order in the present case. The
Report reads:
"Ordinarily the question of rates should not be
given major consideration as an element of convenience and necessity, but in a case such as this where
the proposed rates are in some instances as rnuch
as forty-six per cent under present rates, and .where
a pledge of service is given which would meet the
demands of the public more adequately, these elements must be given consideration by .the Commission." (R. 51)
In other words, rates are directly tied into service. Improper rates may, and in the present case did unduly
prevent the public from utilizing the common carrier
service. That was the point counsel had in mind when he
made his extemporaneo~s statement emphasizing rates
(Brief, 58) which Plaintiff seems to think was the basis
of the Commission's decision. The Commission necessarily, and very properly considered rates as an element in
reaching its decision.
The suggestion is made that if the rates of an ex-
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isting carr1er are improper, thL ll it is the duty of the
Commission to inYL stiga te and order the necessary modifications. But is the Commission limited to that remedy
alone \\·here there is inadequate and unsatisfactory service also·? ~lust it protect the existing utility at all costs 1
ltlust it continue to deprive the public in an adjacent territory of bus service in order to protect the net return
of an existing opera tor-?
1

1

The cases 'Yere more favorable to such protection
where a company had a large fixed investment in a
railw·ay, buildings and equipment in an area. In the
later cases inYolving motorbuses where, as in the instant
case, the operator's entire investment is on wheels, and
is moved out of the area involved each night, the need to
protect the operator is not so great. The Traction Company has no fixed investment south of 33rd South street
whatever-not even good-will-and the public convenience and necessity is the primary consideration.
It 'Yas brought out that it costs the Traction Company about 20 cents per bus mile to operate, (R. 448)
and the Airway at least one-third less. (R. 140, 156) It
would be difficult if not impossible as a practical matter, to prove that the operating costs of the Traction
Company are excessive, except by comparison. An operator should not be protected and the public penalized
if its operating· costs are excessive. Mr. Davis of the
Airway Company was very frank and open, and represented a modern viewpoint on motorbus transportation
\Vhen he told Commissioner Holbrook:
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''If anyone can come along at any time and
offer the public something, with the assurance that
it can be fulfilled, that we can't deliver to the public, we feel that we are willing to step down at any
time.
"Q. And you think that's the element that
this Commission should give weight to in reaching
a decision'
"A. I think they should; I would consider
that public necessity and convenience. First, there
are a lot of people in this community, or any other
community, to whom rate structure means a lot.
There are low-paid people in every community that
the difference between 5 and 10 cents over a period
of a week means a little difference in something
they might have to have to eat in the house over
that period of time; and I really believe that a rate
is very important, especially in an operation that is
conducted for the purpose of transporting people
to and from their work." (R. 166)
Rates are an element of public convenience and
necessity, particularly in connection with metropolitan
mass transportation of persons to and from work. Rates
become relatively less important in inter-state and long
hauls. The distinction in fact as well as in law should be
born in mind in connection with the Inter-State Commerce Commission cases cited by Plaintiff. (Brief, 60-63)
The cases quoted by Plaintiff are not inconsistent
with what we have here asserted. No case is cited by
Plaintiff which ·holds that rates should not be given any
consideration at all. Rather, they substantiate our contention that they are one element to be considered. Take
the case of West Suburban Transportation Co. v. Chica-
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go,
T. Ry. Co., 140 N.E. 56, 'vhich is quoted at length
by Plaintiff (Brief 6-±-68), and re-read the first sentence
quoted:
If the transportation facilities furnished by
appellee are so inadequate as to subject the public
to inconvenience, and the operation of appellant's
bus lines 'Yould eliminate that inconvenience, the
order of the commission ,v·as authorized.''
h

Exactly the case here! But in that case, the court
also made this distinction:
• ~It does not appear that the public has ever
made any complaint that the transportation service
in the to". .ns mentioned vvas inadequate or insufficient, and no proof "\\ aS offered on the hearing to
that effect except the testimony of appellant's officer~, and their testimony is not impressive.''
7

Read the complaints in the testimony of practically
every witness befor~ the Commission in the present case.
Further on (Brief, 67) the court explains that fares are
not the only thing to be considered in a case of this kind.
Obviously it is one thing that can be considered, which
is all that we claim.
The last case cited by Plaintiff, (Brief, 68) Eldridge
vs. Fort \\7 orth Transit Company, 136 S.\V. (2) 955, is
similar. The evidence showed 'vithout dispute that the
service already rendered in the City was adequate. The
evidence shows just the opposite with respect to the
ser\·ice of Plaintiff into :rvfurray and the other communities. If the only matter involved was the offer of
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the Airway to operate at a lower fare, the Commission
would probably never have granted the application.
But that, with inadequate service, unsatisfactory service, and the need for service by an adjoining area affords ample grounds upon which to base the order of
the Commission.
The testimony of certain purported labor representatives who were in no way affected by the proposed
or existing service as patrons should carry no weight
in a hearing on an application for a certificate of public
convenience and necessity. Their testimony (R. 369, 379)
on the whole was unimportant, and certainly incompetent.
To say that the Commission has acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner is somewhat of a catch-all
phrase. To re-quote this court in the recent Fuller-Toponce Truck Co. case, 96 Pac. ( 2d) 722, 98 Utah --------,
last paragraph:
"\Vhatever may be our opinion as to 'vhether
the Commission found well or wisely, or 'vhether
our conclusions on the evidence would have been
the same, we are bound by the findings, when there
is evidence to support them.''
Plaintiff's argument would have been more to the
point had it adhered more closely to the statutes (Sec.
76-6-1, 16, R.S.U. 1933) which fix the scope of review
before this court, an~ defines the prerogatives of the
Public Service Commission.
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PART IV.

CONCLUSION

...-\.. fact snnunary of this case as it was presented to
the Public SerYice Com1nission is set forth on page 10
herein. To that \Ye \Yish onlY to add a further word of
explanation.
If the case were simply a matter of adjusting the
rights of two private corporations, the decision might
be relatiYely simple. In effect, it involves the bread and
·butter transportation for thousands of persons in southern Salt Lake County. It is, in fact their case. This Defendant stepped into the breach at the instance of these
people in a fight for service and adequate service which
has extended over a period of years. Mr. Howe, of
counsel, associated himself in this case at the instance
of Murray City, as its city attorney.
True, the Airway company was and is anxious to
render the service, and is eminently satisfied with the
results of its operations to date. But it would never have
made the application and taken the necessary risks in
what it expected might be, and has proven to be a hotlycontested enterprise, had it not been assured of the almost unanimous support of the people which it proposed
to serve. This spontaneous public support, which seems
to irk the Plaintiff, is a significant, obvious fact. The
Airway lacked the means to stir up such enthusiasm. It
came about as a result of the long and intolerable domination of the public transportation facilities by the
Plaintiff monopoly. It is the natural reaction of a re-

.

~
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buffed public. If the public is again compelled to adjust
itself to the skimpy service proffered by Plaintiff, it
will feel truly thwarted. Not a few will lose faith in the
democratic processes. For even if it is within the power
of the Commission by means of expensive and comprehensive investigations, orders and undoubtedly prolonged litigation, to correct the faulty service and fares of
the Traction Company in the ''served'' area, the public
knows from experience, as does the Commission that it is
well-nigh impossible to prove the fact of inadequate service, excessive operating costs and improper fares and
then to compel compliance thereof upon an unwilling
operator. But as we have pointed out, it is not legally
incumbent upon the Commission to do so in this case,
nor is it incumbent upon this Court to require the Commission to do so.
The public in the area involved are now experiencing and seeing demonstrated a complete solution to
their transportation problem, and in addition they are
now being accorded courteous treatment-an item to
whi~h they are morally, but not legally entitled. The
public in ,Salt Lake City proper where Plaintiff's principal operations exist, since the advent of Airway has
been blessed with extensions, additions and improvements theretofore lacking, and with respect to 'vhich
Plaintiff was vulnerable. A regulated, healthy competition in metropolitan motor bus service is recognized by
courts and commissions as a modern, practical and effective method in securing public convenience and neces-
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sity. The railroad traYeller notes a Yast difference in the
treatment accorded him t"'"enty years ago, and the present serYice "'~ith its air-conditioned, streamlined stewardess-equipped coaches. These modern improvements
"""ere broug·ht about through healthy competition, rather
than compulsion by means of a Commission or court
mandate.
Throughout its brief, Plaintiff has emphasized its
monopolistic rights, and said little about the public convenience and necessity . .J..L\..lthough Plaintiff incidentally
admits that the Commission found there was a public
necessity and convenience for the proposed service.
(Brief, 69) Public convenience and necessity is the only
excuse for existence of a public utility, and should be
the primary consideration in a case of this kind. It is
the fundamental reason which the Public Service Commission had in granting the application. It is a question
of fact, which has been determined after a full and complete hearing and investigation, and with respect to
which we submit the judgment of the Commission should
be upheld.
Respectfully submitted,
A. C. Melville
Glen E. Howe (Murray City Attorney)
Attorneys for Defendant Airway
Motor Coach Lines, Inc.
J. Allan Crockett, Attorney for Public
Service Commission of Utah.
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